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Executive Summary
Build an automatic system for detecting atypical behavior within a health care
application. The development will consist of the following steps:

1) Preprocess log files
Take the raw TXT log files generated from a medical application and convert
them to a format usable by a classification tool (WEKA1).
• Reformat the data so that it adheres to structure required by classifier.
• The application’s log files are event based. Will reconstitute data so that
it is properly organized for a given data run. For example, data might be
manipulated so that it shows activity per doctor for a 24 hour period –
number of patients seen, number of workstations signed into, etc.
• Data will be added to help in classification. For example, information
will be added that show the user’s job: physician, nurse, biller, etc.

2) Classify
Run the processed log files through the classification engine.
• Will use WEKA to run through a variety of classification models and
determine model and configuration that produces optimal results.
• Will attempt to classify various ‘slices’ of data to see which produce the
best results. For example, we will compare the classification of user
group nurses to the classification of pharmacists.
• System alerts will be actionable items – in that a nurse that doesn’t act
like other nurses should be investigated.

3) Tune
Build process to filter out data that should be ignored.
• Allow for marking of ‘false positive’ or ‘false negative’ alerts.
Specifically, if an instance is validated as a misclassification, we will
remove it from dataset in order to achieve better classification (once
classification is rerun).

4) Report
Produce meaningful reports supporting the investigation as to whether alert is
appropriate.
• Generate usable data to support investigation of the misclassified
instances.

1

http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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1. Introduction
Health care informatics is growing at an incredible pace. Originally health care
organizations, like all other industries, used pen and paper to track medical
information. Ten years ago the more mature health care organizations had
simply practice management applications. Today these organizations have full
blown electronic health records systems. Tomorrow these organizations will be
sharing information across the globe.
Physicians (and the sponsoring organizations) are obligated to protect this data.
Health care has followed the trend of many other industries in implementing
technologies and processes to address certain risks. Encryption is enabled to
ensure confidentiality. Business continuity techniques are applied to ensure
system availability. However there is no ‘best practice’ solution that can be
applied to the problem of detecting inappropriate activity. How can a hospital
tell when Nurse Smith is ‘snooping’ in medical records? How can a radiologist
tell when a lab technician is feeding information to a law firm?
This paper will describe the efforts to design, build, and run a system that will
detect atypical behavior in a health care application and see if that behavior is
indicative of inappropriate activity. The first section will discuss the impetus
for such a system. The second section will describe the design and
implementation of this system. The third section will document a series of
experiments showing the accuracy of such a system in detecting inappropriate
activity.
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2. Background
“What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the treatment in
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep
myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about.2”

Physicians and health care organizations are privy to a large amount of private
information. As custodians of this data they are obligated to ensure its privacy
and security. In the days of paper records this was a manageable exercise with
minimal risk. Physical locks kept people away from records.
But with the advent of electronic medical records the landscape has changed. In
a large modern health care system, the intensive care unit will share the same
data store as behavioral health (though hopefully with different access rights).
Records are extremely easy to copy and move. Overlay this with the enormous
complexity of modern health care business, for example with employees,
contractors, students, job sharing, outsourcing, and the mobile workforce.
Ensuring the privacy of medical information is an extremely difficult task.
Guaranteeing privacy is impossible.
Luckily information security community has reached the level of maturity
where people understand that security and privacy might never be guaranteed.
Organizations generally strive for reasonable security by means of policies,
auditing and access control, but complement this with other reactive controls. A
common safeguard used for this is auditing. This will lead to “reasonable and
appropriate3” controls to enforce security with the ability to look and see these
were circumvented or misused.
Most modern health care applications provide robust auditing. However there is
no easy way to detect inappropriate activity using static rules. Consider the
following scenarios:
•
•
•

Is it inappropriate that Nurse Smith looked at 20 patients?
Is it inappropriate that Nurse Smith printed 50 documents?
Is it inappropriate that Nurse Smith signed on to 10 workstations?

Due to the variable nature of healthcare workflows, these may be appropriate or
they may not. But what if it were possible to compare Nurse Smith’s activity
to that of other nurses? If Nurse Smith’s activity was significantly different
than his peers then this might warrant review.

2
3

Hippocratic Oath
This language is directly pulled from the HIPAA security ruleset.
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3. Impetus
3.1 HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was signed
into law by President Clinton in 1996. The law was intended to address some
major shortcoming in the current health insurance arena. The legislation
specifically “provides for improved access, portability, continuity, and
renewability of employment-related group health plans. The act also addresses
health insurance fraud and abuse, promotes the use of medical savings accounts,
improves access to long-term care insurance coverage, and simplifies and
coordinates Medicare benefits.4”
The HIPAA legislation consists of five titles. Title one, ‘Health Insurance
Reform’, was meant to protect employees who switch jobs by mandating
continued coverage to ensure there was no gap in coverage.5 A gap in coverage
would then allow insurance companies to deny coverage of preexisting
conditions. Insurance companies were now forced to accept consumers who
were covered under a previous plan without consideration of pre-existing
conditions.
Title two, ‘Administrative Simplification’, mandated standards by which
various insurance functions could be done electronically. By driving the
industry to electronic transactions, the law hoped to lessen “administrative
burden, lower operating costs, and improve overall data quality6”. The most
significant of these provisions is under the Administrative Simplification from
which the privacy and security standards derive.
The remaining three titles, ‘Tax Related Health Provisions’, ‘Application and
Enforcement of Group Health Plan Requirements’, and ‘Revenue Offsets’ make
up the remainder of the law.

3.2 Administrative Simplification
In passing HIPAA, the federal government tasked the Department of Health and
Human Services with adopting standards in support of the law. Their first
objective was to encourage the use of electronic transactions for various health
care functions. To that effect, DHHS adopted standards to drive this initiative.
On August 17, 2000 the final rule on ‘Standard for Electronic Transaction and
Code Set7’ was published (65 FR 50312). In it were references to dozens of
detailed rule sets that had been defined by various industry groups. DHHS did
not in fact design data structures or protocols, but rather worked with the health
insurance industry to choose the best among the competing rule sets.
4

http://www.amcp.org/data/jmcp/vol5/num2/niecko.html
http://www.cms.gov/HealthInsReformforConsume/02_WhatHIPAADoesandDoesNotDo.asp
6
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/txfinal.pdf
7
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/txfinal.pdf

5
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HIPAA was creating an infrastructure by which health insurance companies and
entities they deal with could easily send information back and forth. When
compared with paper-based processes, electronic transactions would
undoubtedly be quicker and cheaper. Hospitals would now have the ability to
check real-time if an insurance card was valid, what the subscriber’s co-pay
was, and what benefits were covered under the patient’s plan.
However with the ease by which this information can move, law makers
realized that the public would have concerns about the use and misuse of their
information. Could a pharmaceutical company use this information to target
potential customers? Could psychiatric notes be used in a child custody case?
Law makers had to include guidelines for the use and protection of this
information. To that end, the Administrative Simplification section of HIPAA
required the creation of standards for both data privacy and security5. The
former ensures that protected information is only used in ways authorized by the
law, while the later sets rules by which health care organizations must protect
the data.

3.2.1 Security Standard
Realizing that health care organizations would be accumulating a mass of data
that must be protected from misuse, the Department of Health and Human
Services was tasked with creating the Security Standard. In April 2003, HHS
published its final ‘Security Standards’ document with the intent to “establish a
minimum standard for security of electronic health information8”.
The standards lay out a couple of dozen requirements for health care
organizations. For example they are required to have a termination policy to
ensure that accounts are disabled as soon as possible after an employee leaves
the company. Another requirement is that companies must have a disaster
recovery plan to ensure timely resumption of services after a disaster.
The security standards also require that companies have security incident
procedures. Specifically they are required to implement policies and procedures
to “identify and respond to suspected or known security incidents; mitigate, to
the extent practical, harmful effects of security incidents that are known to the
covered entity; and document security incidents and their outcomes.9”
The standard goes on to define a security incidents as follows: “the attempted or
successful unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction of
information or interference with system operations in an information system10”.

8

45 CFR 164 Subpart C “Guiding Principles for Standard Selection”
45 CFR §164.308
10
45 CFR §164.308

9
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This is a difficult standard to meet because it requires organizations to detect
when someone successfully accesses medical data that he shouldn’t. On the
surface this appears to be straight forward – boiling down to a simple question –
“Is Nurse Smith authorized to look at patient Jones’ information”? In the
complex world of medical entities with convoluted relationships as well as
poorly defined roles, this is an extremely difficult question to answer. In a large
hospital where data is accessed thousands of times by a myriad people, devices
and locations each and every day, this would need to be automated. How could
a computer tell appropriate versus inappropriate access?
There is no good answer to this question. Luckily for health care organizations,
HIPAA was considered a toothless law. 11 The standard had no requirement for
external reporting, and enforcement was only complaint-based. This meant that
the data leak had to been traceable back to the health care organization – which
is extremely difficult in most cases.
In fact 2010, a full six years after HIPAA Privacy rule set went into effect, was
the first time a person was sentenced to prison for violation of this law. There
were only a handful of other prosecutions resulting in minimal fines. For the
time being, there was little reason for organizations to struggle with this
problem.

3.3 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act12 (ARRA) was passed in 2009
in response the economic crisis. It had the stated goals of job creation and
spurring economic activity. As part of this stimulus package, the bill makes
billions of dollars available to drive adoption of health information technology
within the industry. Law makers also include language meant to address some
of the short comings of the original HIPAA privacy and security rules. These
provisions are included in a subtitle of ARRA called HITECH.

3.3.1 Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act13
These provisions increased the impetus for health care organizations to look for
and address inappropriate activity. This was done in two ways. First the act
greatly increased the number of entities that needed to comply with HIPAA.
Previously only health care provider, insurance companies and clearing houses
had to comply with HIPAA requirements. These entities are collectively known
as covered entities. Now companies that utilize protected health information on
behalf of covered entities must also adhere to the HIPAA requirements. This
means that companies that provide billing services, call center services or
11

http://law.vanderbilt.edu/publications/vanderbilt-law-review/archive/volume-60-number-1-january2007/download.aspx?id=2531
12
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ005.pdf
13
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/hitech.pdf
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hundreds of other outsourced services for covered entities are now subject to the
provisions of the original HIPAA law. The number of entities that were
required to comply with these rules grew exponentially overnight.
The second way that HITECH changed how health care organizations dealt with
inappropriate activity is that it put strict requirements on breach notification. In
cases were breaches were detected, HIPAA did not obligate organizations to
notify affected users. Health care organizations were free to notify the affected
individual if they chose but were not strictly required to do so. Under ARRA
entities are obligated to make a series of notifications that were “made without
unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after the
discovery of a breach14”.
In addition to mandating notifications in a timely fashion, the law set forth who
needs to be notified. Organizations that experienced a data breach must notify
not only the affected person but also the Secretary of Health and Human
Services for any sized breach. Additionally if the incident included more than
500 individuals, organizations must make “prominent media outlets” aware of
the breach.
ARRA now required organizations to deal with breaches in a timely fashion.
Delayed responses can put the organization at odds with these laws. ARRA has
the teeth that HIPAA lacked. Organizations now had to get serious about
protecting health care information.

3.4 Other Drivers
HIPAA and ARRA have provisions to ensure that private health information is
properly protected. However that is not the only type of consumer data held by
health care organizations. For the purposes of managing patients’ records and
accounts, a large amount of private data must be kept above and beyond health
care information. Each of these data types have their own set of mandates
requiring organizations to look for inappropriate access.

3.4.1 State Breach Laws
Nearly all states have laws in place requiring business to notify consumers when
their personal information has been misappropriated.15 Though these vary from
state to state, they mostly have the same basic requirements. Business that deal
with private consumer data must notify affected individuals where their
personal information has been misappropriated. In the state of Illinois,
personal information includes the patient’s name in combination with his social
security number, driver’s license number or credit card number.

14

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-20169.pdf 164.408

15

http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/SecurityBreachNotificati
onLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx
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Organizations with the ability to detect inappropriate activity and respond
quickly to contain the situation might limit their liability in regards to this
statute.

3.4.2 PCI
The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council is an association of
financial institutions interested in development and adoption of security
standards for the protection of data accounts. This group developed a robust set
of standards, collectively known as Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards or PCI-DSS16, which set forth a proscriptive list of safeguards
intended to protect these sorts of financial transactions. All merchants that use
credit cards are contractually obligated to comply with these rule sets. Noncompliance can result in fines and higher transactional fees. In the worse cases,
the organization may be prohibited from using credit cards.
PCI-DSS requires logging of activity on systems that process cardholder or
sensitive authentication data. Additionally these logs must be reviewed
regularly looking for the purpose of ‘preventing, detecting, or minimizing the
impact of a data compromise’.

3.4.3 Class Action Lawsuits
There have been several attempts to file civil17 or class action18 lawsuits in
response to breaches of private information. As shown above, health care
organizations are now required to publicize breaches of private data. This will
become more common as the number of data breaches will unlikely continue.
To protect themselves from these lawsuits, health care organizations must show
that they follow best practices in protection and monitoring of this private
information.

3.5 Summary
Health care organizations are used to dealing with a plethora of regulations and
compliance efforts in regards to accreditation, state and federal requirements
and insurance mandates. Protection of health care information is one more
issue that will have to be dealt with. The more successful these organizations
become in detecting inappropriate activity, the better suited they will be to
comply with these requirements.

16

https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/tags/data-breach-litigation/
18
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/18598

17
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4. Challenge
With the obvious need to look for unauthorized access to protected information,
why is this so difficult? This appears to be a simple question of who needs to
see what information. However for a variety of reasons there is no easy answer
to this question.
The main issue is that medical entities have typically defaulted to open access
instead of closed access. This is due to the nature of the work being done. In
health care quick access to data is of paramount importance. Imagine the case
where a physician is prevented access to critical data in the middle of a
procedure.
There are also concerns about the efficiencies of physicians. Any technology or
process that is seen as impeding physician work will be viewed unfavorably by
physicians. Health care organizations are keenly aware of this and account for
this when designing systems. It would be unacceptable to have physicians call
the help desk to get access to a patient’s information.
The last factor is the complex web of relationships in health care. This creates a
very convoluted list of requirements that generally start from the basis that a
physician has access to his patients in the system in which he works. Physician
staff derives rights to the same patients’ data based on their relationship to the
physician.
This is extremely difficult to implement effectively.
• A medical coder will need access to most sensitive information
regarding a client for billing purposes.
• Outsource clinical services exist for reading of medical images.
• Physicians may or may not be employed by a hospital.
• Physicians may have relationships with multiple hospitals.
• Nurses often need access to all information that their doctor can access.
• Non-clinicians (such as dieticians) may need to access parts of the
patient’s information.
• Information on a given patient may exist in multiple locations such as in
a hospital’s electronic medical record system (EMR), a practice’s
practice management system (PMS) and in his personal health record
(PHR).
• Non-clinical services such as billing and transcription are often
outsourced. These companies will hold data from multiple physicians,
labs and hospitals.
• Radiologists are not directly associated with any patient but would need
to access many records.
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Now consider the case where Nurse Smith is snooping on his neighbor’s records
at the hospital. How can this be detected? It is a very difficult situation that
cannot be addressed via a simple rule-based analysis. The biller looking at the
most number of patients is not necessarily being malicious. The pharmacist that
looks at more than 25 patients is not necessarily being malicious. A static,
rule-based approach to detecting atypical behavior is not effective.
Luckily this problem is not unique to health care informatics. There is a whole
branch of computer science called Machine Learning (ML) that designs tools to
help machine automatically detect patterns and derive meaning from them. In
ML, the task of detecting atypical behavior can be done by building a
classification model for typical behavior and identifying the misclassified
behavior/items. And there are several classification tools in ML. These tools
have been successfully applied to many real world problems, for instance:
• Which emails is spam?
• Is a patient better suited for hard or soft contacts?
• Can species of plant be automatically identified based on attributes?
The following describes a system that will attempt to use classification models
to identify which users of this medical system are not acting like their peers.
This will then allow anomaly detection to shift from rule-based reporting to a
more heuristical model that flags abnormal events by comparing a user’s
activity to that of others in the same role.
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5. Data
Data for this experiment was pulled from a medical application, McKesson
Portal. This system is the primary tool used to view data from dozens of
medical systems. Logs representing two months of activity (October and
November 2009) were included. The health care system from which these
were pulled consisted of 9 hospitals and 15,000 employees.
The system produces log files which record various activities. To maintain
HIPAA compliance, the system produces very detailed logs. Below is a listing
of events captured in the logs.
• 100_SignIn – This event is logged when a user successfully
authenticates to the application.
• 100_SignOut – This event is logged when a user is signed out of the
application. This can be done by the user or as a result of automatic
timeout.
• 100_AutoSuspend – This event is logged when a user’s session is
suspended after a set period of inactivity.
• 100_LeaveSuspend – This event is logged when a user’s session is
removed from a suspended state.
• 100_ManualSuspend – This event is logged when a user chooses to
suspend his session.
• 100_ModuleAccess – This event is logged when a user accesses a new
module within the application. Modules are specific views to
accomplish certain tasks such as patient lists, station census and
transcription.
• 100_ChangePatientContext – This event is logged when a user is
granted access to a patient’s information. Once granted access the user
will be able to view that patient’s data.
• 300_SignInError – This event is logged when an attempted signin fails.
• 400_ModulePrint – This event is logged when a user uses the print
function within the module.
Two events make up the vast majority of logged events. 100_ModuleAccess
accounts for 83% of the events and 100_ChangePatientContext accounts for
12%. 100_SignIn and 100_SignOut make up another 3%. No other event
accounts for more than 1% of the events.
The raw logs are written to simple text files and the data is XML-formatted.
Below is an example of a typical entry19. Some details vary based on the
specific event. For example a 100_SignIn event does not record a patient’s
name.
20091001:000221.190:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
19

Note that confidential information such as patient name was omitted in this example.
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<AuditMessage xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://infosolutions.mckesson.com/audit/HL7auditmessagepayload.xsd"
>
<EventIdentification EventActionCode="R" EventDateTime="20090930235536"
EventID="100_ModuleAccess" EventOutcomeIndicator="0">
</EventIdentification>
<UserIdentification RoleID="504" UserID="#USERNAME#">
</UserIdentification>
<AuditSourceIdentification AuditSourceID="HorizonWP Physician Portal" AuditSourceType="3">
</AuditSourceIdentification>
<NetworkAccessPointIdentification NetworkAccessPointID="#WORKSTATION#"
NetworkAccessPointTypeCode="1">
</NetworkAccessPointIdentification>
<NetworkAccessPointIdentification NetworkAccessPointID="#IPADDRESS#"
NetworkAccessPointTypeCode="2">
</NetworkAccessPointIdentification>
<ParticipantObjectIdentification ParticipantObjectDataLifeCycle="5" ParticipantObjectID="Announcement Patient Search" ParticipantObjectITypeCode="12" ParticipantObjectTypeCode="2">
</ParticipantObjectIdentification>
<ParticipantObjectIdentification ParticipantObjectDataLifeCycle="1"
ParticipantObjectID="#MEDRECORD#" ParticipantObjectITypeCode="1"
ParticipantObjectName="#PATIENTNAME# " ParticipantObjectTypeCode="1">
</ParticipantObjectIdentification>
<ParticipantObjectIdentification ParticipantObjectDataLifeCycle="1" ParticipantObjectITypeCode="2"
ParticipantObjectName="#PATIENTNAME# " ParticipantObjectTypeCode="1">
</ParticipantObjectIdentification>
</AuditMessage>
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6. System Components
It was necessary to do a series of pre-processing to prepare the data for analysis.

6.1 PreProcess.pl
Each log entry represents a single transaction for a user. For the purpose of
analyzing user activity, it was necessary to consolidate data into periods of time.
A single transaction of Dr Smith logging into the system is a poor data point.
However by viewing all transactions for Dr Smith for a given day, this can be
more readily compared and contrasted against other users of the system.
• How many times this day did Dr Smith sign in?
• How many patients were viewed by Dr Smith?
• How many workstations did Dr Smith use this day?
• How does this compare to other physicians?
• How does this compare to nurses? Or receptionist? Or other staff?
The raw logs were processed into 24 hour blocks. This means that for the
purposes of classification, an instance is the cumulative activity for a user for a
single day.
There are three general types of data stored for each instance. First there were
many simple counts. For example an instance shows the total number of
patients seen by the user for that day.
Secondly the system recorded aggregate information for an instance. For
example the system records the total number of unique patients accessed by the
user over the course of the day. This aggregate information can be significantly
different from the simple totals. A nurse in an intensive care unit (ICU) may
work with only a dozen patients over the course of the day, but each time she
changes context to another patient a 100_ChangePatientContext event is logged.
So in a typical day, this ICU nurse may have worked with 10 patients looking at
each patient’s records 5 times. That would be recorded as 50 total patients but
only 10 unique patients.
Lastly, in addition to recording total and aggregate counts, other data was added
regarding the user. Specifically it was necessary to record supplemental
information to help classify the user. For example the raw log files record the
user name, such as ASmith, but not necessarily the role. To analyze activity
from a role-based perspective, it was necessary to tell if ASmith is a physician,
a nurse or something else.
The source for role information came from the organization’s Windows AD
system. For each user found in the logs, the user account name was queried in
Windows. The user account description field was parsed looking for certain
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text strings indicating the role. The text strings were the bases for assigning a
value to the data point called RoleAD.
Note that the application does in fact record a RoleID attribute with each log
entry. This is intended to be used by the system administrators to document the
role information for a given user account. However, in this health care
organization’s implementation, this field was not consistently used and was
considered less reliable than Windows AD.
The PreProcess script20 generates output21 written to a comma separated value
(CSV) file.

6.2 WekaDBManagement.pl
The classification engine used (WEKA) is able to pull data from a variety of
sources. It would be able to pull data directly from the PreProcess data file.
However it was desirous to be able to initiate classification runs on various
views of the data without having to reprocess the log files.
To achieve this the PreProcess output needed to be imported in a database.
Then by the use of SQL calls, the necessary flexibility was achieved. So instead
of being restricted to considering the whole data set, it was possible to slice the
data in many different ways.
• Look at all sites together, any single site, or a combination thereof.
• Dynamically change the class being classified. That allowed, for
example, the analysis of physician’s activity followed by the analysis of
pharmacists'.
• Look at different date ranges.
• Provided ability to ignore certain instances or users.
The PreProcess output was imported into the database by means of the
WekaDBManagement script. This populated two different tables: instances and
users. The instances table contains the relevant information on the various
instances. While this table was being populated, the user information was
reviewed and added to the users table. In addition to a single entry for each
user, summary information over the entire 60 day dataset was collected such as
the average number of logins and the average number of patients. This
summary information is intended to provide a view into the user’s typical
behavior.
Additionally the system flagged cases where there were changes to the user
information. For example the system would flag cases where the user signed
into workstations at more than one location. These are written to the events
table.
20
21

The PreProcess script can be found in the supporting documents.
The PreProcess output file can be found in the supporting documents.
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6.3 MCInfo.pl
For the purposes of easily retrieving information needed for analysis, a script
was written which pulled relevant information from the raw log files. The script
pulls information from ARFF files (WEKA output) and prompts the user to
provide details necessary to narrow down the request.
• FileName: Path and filename of ARFF file
• Analysis Type: Instance will report on single instance. Classification
will report on entire leaf. User will pull up all instances associated with
that particular user.
The script will prompt the user for information based on the type of analysis
requested. At the end of each request, the raw log files will be presented
allowing the analyst to see the detailed activity.

6.4 Database
The database holds all information regarding instances, users and any tuning
efforts. It consists of three tables: instances, users, and events.

6.4.1 Instance Table
The instances table holds the individual instances derived from the application
logs. The table is populated by the WekaDBManagement script.
CREATE TABLE `weka`.`instances` (
`User` varchar(20) NOT NULL,
`LogFile` int(11) NOT NULL,
`Logins` int(10) NOT NULL,
`Hours` int(10) NOT NULL,
`LogOuts` int(10) NOT NULL,
`Suspends` int(10) NOT NULL,
`ModulesUnique` int(10) NOT NULL,
`ModulesTotal` int(10) NOT NULL,
`PatientsUnique` int(10) NOT NULL,
`PatientsTotal` int(10) NOT NULL,
`APWW` int(10) NOT NULL,
`PrintModule` int(10) NOT NULL,
`WorkstationsUnique` int(10) NOT NULL,
`IgnoreInstance` int(10) NOT NULL DEFAULT '0')

All of these values are pulled directly from the log files and represent totals for
that log file – a 24 hour period. Additionally the IgnoreInstance attribute was
added to support tuning efforts -- this column is used to exclude specific
instances when importing data into WEKA, because it may be of value to ignore
certain data while analyzing specific instances.

6.4.2 Users
The users table holds information regarding the individual users of the system.
This table is populated by the WekaDBManagement script. Whenever a record
is added to the Instances table, the scripts looks to see if a corresponding user
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exists. If the a record doesn’t exist it will be added. If a record does exist for
this user, then the values will be updated.
CREATE TABLE `weka`.`users` (
`User` varchar(20) NOT NULL,
`InstanceCount` int(11) DEFAULT '1',
`LoginsAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`HoursAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`LogOutsAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`SuspendsAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`ModulesUniqueAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`ModulesTotalAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`PatientsUniqueAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`PatientsTotalAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`APWWAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`PrintModuleAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`WorkstationUniqueAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`Site` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`RoleAD` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`RoleID` int(11) DEFAULT NULL,
`Groups` varchar(3000) DEFAULT NULL,
`IgnoreUser` int(10) DEFAULT '0',
PRIMARY KEY (`User`))

Most of the data in a given record consists of aggregate data for the user across
the entire range of logs. This provides a view into the average number of logins
(LoginsAvg) or the average number of print jobs (PrintModulesAvg) for the
user. This information is intended to show typical behavior for the user and will
be useful when analyzing misclassified instances.
Additionally there are a few columns that help identify the user’s role. RoleAD
is used to assign the user a role based on the information pulled from the
organization’s Windows AD infrastructure22. RoleID assigns the user a role
based on information maintained in the application’s user table23. Groups is a
listing of all AD groups which the user account is included in. As the
organization uses AD groups to assign access to many resources, this
information was captured to see if this might be a more accurate method of
ascribing roles to users.
Lastly there is a column that records the site which the user works at. This was
determined based on the workstations the user signed into. If the user signed
into workstations from multiple sites, a record was added to the event table.

6.4.3 Events
In addition to flagging when a user works at more than one site, the
WekaDBManagement script looks for other data changes that might indicate
unusual activity. Specifically changes to RoleAD, RoleID, and Groups are also
22
23

Mapping of AD to role can be found in FindUserComments subroutine of the PreProcess script.
Details on the application roles can be found in the RoleID Codes spreadsheet.
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logged. This was intended to show another view of the user’s activity that
might be useful when analyzing misclassifications.
CREATE TABLE `weka`.`events` (
`Type` varchar(45) NOT NULL,
`Description` varchar(3000) NOT NULL)
Lastly it should be noted that no confidential patient data is held in the database.
This data is captured in the original application logs but is removed by the
Preprocess script. Below is a data architecture diagram showing the various
components described above.

6.5 Classification System
The WEKA24 data mining software package was used as a classification engine.
This tool is a multipurpose machine learning engine that supports many types of
classifications based on common ML algorithms.
For the purposes of this exercise, a single classification algorithm was used.
The J48 algorithm in WEKA produces a C4.5 decision tree. This type of
classification was chosen, not only because it is scalable to large datasets, it also
produces output (i.e. decision tree) that can be easily understood by a user. It is
expected that by analyzing the decision tree, the user can make educated
decisions regarding likely candidates (atypical behavior) for further
investigation.

24

http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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In some cases parameters were used to adjust the level of pruning associated
with the decision tree. The ‘confidence level’ parameter in J48 affects the tree
size by setting the threshold for how confident the system should be in the
decision. The ‘minimum number of objects’ parameter controls the minimum
number of objects that should be in a resulting leaf.
WEKA will construct a decision tree which most accurately classifies the
instances. Once the tree is generated the system runs the original data set
through the tree to determine accuracy. There are several metrics produced that
measure the accuracy but two are especially important for our purposes. The
overall accuracy shows how accurate the tree classified all users. Additionally
there is a separate accuracy rate for the users in a specific role.
For example if a tree attempts to classify physicians and has an overall accuracy
rate of 80%, that means that four out of five users (physicians and nonphysicians) were correctly classified. Additionally the system’s ability to
classify physicians might be 90%. This says that if someone was a physician,
the system would correctly classify them nine out of ten times25. This was
important in cases where the role in question represented a small number of the
total user base.
The third accuracy measurement is associated with a given leaf of a tree. For
each leaf, the accuracy is calculated for all instances that navigated to this
particular node.

25

Conversely a non-physician would be classified correctly with less than 80% accuracy.
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7. Exercises
The remainder of this paper will document various attempts at using the above
described system to find atypical behavior, investigate it and determine if this
behavior represent inappropriate activity. The efforts documented below start
with a description of each run. This describes the starting data set and the initial
classification run. For example a run might attempt to analyze all nurses at site
4. Subsequent to each run is a series of investigations. These are attempts to
derive meaning from the results of the classification run. So an investigation
might attempt to determine why a certain number of nurses were incorrectly
classified.

7.1 Types of Investigations
When reviewing the results of a given classification run, investigations are done
in one of a few ways. The first method uses ad-hoc analysis to find atypical
behavior. This is generally done by visual inspection looking for interesting
nodes. Attribute of a node that could trigger investigations includes
classification accuracy (or inaccuracy) and the nature of the path (e.g. large
number of unique patients).
The second method of investigation incorporates consideration for the length of
the path. How does a node that is reached by a single decision compare to one
that takes 8 decisions? For these investigations, samples will be taken that
represent short, medium and long path lengths.
The third method attempts to make a more accurate tree by removing outlying
instances. This filtered-classification is done by running a normal initial
classification run and then pulling out all misclassified instances. After this the
remaining dataset is reclassified. The resulting decision tree is then analyzed by
either ad-hoc or path-length investigation.
It should be noted that in the investigation of misclassified instances, both falsepositive and false-negative classifications were reviewed. The specific
meanings of these cases are relative to the specific run. In the case of
classifying physicians, an example false-positive would be the case where a
nurse acts like a physician, and an example false-negative would be the case
where a physician does not act like his peers. Either case can be troubling. The
first could indicate a snooping nurse while the second may indicate the doctor
has shared his credentials. Both are cases of inappropriate activity.

7.2 Node Research
Once it is decided that a node is to be investigated, two primary tools are used
for research. First the raw log files are pulled either by means of MCInfo.pl or
by simple searching through the log files. This will show specific detailed
information.
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The second method of researching nodes is by using SQL calls against the
WEKA database. This produces a simple high level view of the misclassified
(or properly classified) instances. Additionally this can give a view into the
historical behavior of any users. This is a valuable tool when determining
whether or not atypical behavior (misclassified) is inappropriate activity.
To show how historical information can help when investigating instances,
consider the case of a misclassified nurse. If Nurse Jones had a misclassified
instance where in a 16 hours shift she looked at 100 unique patients, this in
itself may be suspicious. However it might be that in a typical day Nurse Jones
looks at 50 unique patients. Furthermore it might be that Nurse Jones’ typical
shift is 8 hours, so this is in line with her typical historical behavior. So in the
case described above the higher-than-normal values might simply indicate that
Nurse Jones has worked a double shift that day.

7.3 Summary of Runs
Below is a list of classification runs detailed in the next section. For each run
detailed output from WEKA and SQL are available in the supporting documents
section.
•
•
•

•
•
•

Run 43 investigates pharmacists from site 0. Ad-hoc investigations
found two suspicious instances.
Run 38 classifies residents at site 4. Ad-hoc investigations discovered
several users with suspicious activity.
Run 46 combines residents and physicians at site 4 in a single
classification group. The path-length investigations produced four
suspicious instances.
Run 47 considers physicians of site 6. Several path-length investigation
uncovered several cases of suspicious activity.
Run 42 investigates physician assistants from site 0. The filteredclassification investigations did produce one suspicious instance.
Run 48 investigates case-workers from site 2. This also used the
filtered-classification method, and flagged four suspicious instances.

Note that the Weka files and spreadsheets associated with these runs are
available in the supporting documents section.

7.4 Run 43
This run analyzes pharmacists from site 0. It was selected to examine how the
system would treat a smaller user group. For this site pharmacists account for
only 202 of the 9620 instances – 2.1%. The following SQL code was used for
the date import.
SELECT logins, hours, logouts, suspends, modulesunique, modulestotal,
patientstotal, patientsunique, apww, printmodule, workstationsunique,
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if(rolead = 8, '1', '0') as class
from instances, users
where instances.user = users.user
and site = 5
Attribute filtering was attempted but was found to significantly reduce the
accuracy. As shown above, the entire set of attributes were used.
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 5) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 99.3%. The
classification accuracy of actual pharmacists was 79.9%. The following tree
was generated.

7.4.1 Investigation 1
Many instance followed the path to the node [0(8206/19)]. The system
predicted these instances were of role 0 (not pharmacist). Of the 8206
instances, 19 were misclassified resulting in a high accurate rate of 99.7%.
Note that there are only 13 pharmacists in the site and they accounted for only
202 of the 9620 instances. The following SQL call was used to display the
misclassified users. Notice that the SQL code directly maps out the path to the
particular leaf.
select * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 5
and modulesunique > 7
and rolead = 8
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The activity for the 19 pharmacists did not show any significant differences
when compared to either the users’ typical behavior or to the typical behavior
across all pharmacists.

7.4.2 Investigation 2
This node [1(130/3)] shows a group of instances that had a high accuracy rate
(97.6%) and only three misclassified instances. The following SQL call was
used to display the misclassified users.
select * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 5
and modulesunique = 7
and patientsunique > 4
and printmodules <= 0
and rolead <> 8
The three instances represent two users, one a physician and the other a Quality
Outcomes Case Manager. The activity for these three instances was not out of
line based on the users’ previous behavior.

7.4.3 Investigation 3
This node [1(50/15)] shows a group of instances that had a lower accuracy rate
(70%). It was selected for investigation to see whether or not the nodes with
lower accuracy rates produce better information than high accuracy nodes. This
node had 15 misclassified non-pharmacists. The following SQL call was used
to display the misclassified users.
select * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 5
and modulesunique = 7
and patientsunique <=4
and suspends > 0
and logouts <=2
and printmodule <=0
and rolead <> 8
The following observations can be made regarding this node.
• One user (afeokt01) had numbers that were much lower than his typical
work day. It was noted that this user’s shift was much shorter than
normal that day.
• One user (krobles) had three separate instances in this node. One shift
had one metric, ModulesTotal, much higher than normal even though his
shift length was normal. However this is not considered inappropriate
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since the user did not have a rise in the number of ModulesUnique (i.e.
he was working within his normal set of modules).

7.5 Run 38
This run analyzes residents (physicians in training) from site 4. The following
SQL code was used for the date import.
SELECT hours, modulesunique, modulestotal, patientstotal, APWW,
PrintModule, WorkstationsUnique,
if(rolead = 2, '1', '0') as class
from instances, users
where instances.user = users.user
and ignoreinstance = 0
and ignoreuser = 0
and site = 4
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 5) produced an overall accuracy of 82.3% and a true positive classification of
residents with an accuracy of 77.5%. The following tree was produced.

The question was then asked: what information can be gleaned from this result
set. Furthermore can this be used to detect inappropriate activity? The activity
associated with several leafs were investigated.
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7.5.1 Investigation 1
There is a leaf in the middle [0 (38.0/2.0)] where 38 instances ended up. The
system predicted that these users were not residents (i.e. class 0). The
classification was accurate for 36 out of 38 instances (94.7%). Using the
following SQL code, the two users were identified.
SELECT * FROM weka.instances i, weka.users u
where modulesunique > 20
and hours <= 3
and patientstotal <= 20
and site = 4
and rolead = 2
and i.user = u.user
The mapping showed that these two residents did in fact act unusually as
compared to their peers. But did they act in ways inconsistent with their own
historical usage patterns? The results of the above SQL call allowed us to make
the following observations.
•
•

User sjabsh01 had 50 recorded instances over the entire data set. The
misclassified instances were consistent with this historical behavior.
User pkarth01 had 29 recorded instances over the entire data set. His
usage across all metrics was considerably less than average including his
number of hours. This would indicate that this resident was acting
normally, but just worked a shorted day.

There appears to be no activity of concern in this leaf.

7.5.2 Investigation 2
There is another leaf in the middle [1 (14.0/3.0)] where 14 instances ended up.
The system predicted that these users were residents (i.e. class 1). The
classification was accurate 11 out of 14 times (78.5%). The following SQL call
was used to show the misclassified instances.
SELECT * FROM weka.instances i, weka.users u
where modulesunique > 20
and hours <= 3
and patientstotal > 20
and site = 4
and rolead <> 2
and i.user = u.user
Activity from the 3 misclassified users was reviewed.
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•
•
•

User ccosta01 had 54 instances over the entire dataset. The user’s
activity was consistent with his historical patterns.
User agupta01 had 51 instances over the entire dataset. The user’s
activity was consistent with his historical patterns.
User mhyser01 had 37 instances over the entire data set. While working
an expected number of hours, this user saw considerably more patients
and more modules than normal. To further investigate this user, the
following steps were taken.
o Upon further review, it was determined that the user was
misclassified and was actually a physician.
o User’s activity for the day was pulled from the raw logs. The
activity which deviated from historical norms for that user was
reviewed.
o The number of unique modules, 27, substantially deviated from
his historical activity. Below is a breakdown of the user’s
behavior over the entire dataset.
ModulesUnique
5
8
9
11
12
27

Count
14
3
4
2
13
1

o However the number of patients did not deviate. Upon review of
the unusual modules seen by this user, there is no evidence of
suspicious activity. Below is a listing of the modules viewed by
this user.
Typical
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y

Modules
Announcement - GE Muse
Announcement - Medication Orders
Announcement - Patient Search
Announcement - Physician Search
Announcement - Physicians
Announcement - Results
Announcement - Transcriptions Alert
CM MPI/Active Search
CM Patient Demographics
CM Staff Directory
CM Station Census
CM Summary Viewer
CM Working Patient List
GE Muse Web Results
Login
My Personal Notes
My Web Page Links
OLR/RMC/SFH Clinical Documentation
Patient Demographics with Images
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N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N

RES-Net Diagnosis and Procedure
RES-Net Facesheets
RES-Net Insurance Notes
RES-Net Laboratory and Radiology Results
RES-Net Meds Manager Meds Viewer
RES-Net Orders Selection
RES-Net Transcription
RMC/OLR/SFH DocView

7.5.3 Investigation 3
There is a node [0 (253/82))] where 82 residents were misclassified. The
system predicted that these users were not residents (i.e. class 0). The
classification had a relatively low accuracy rate of 36 out of 38 times (67.5%).
SELECT * FROM weka.instances i, weka.users u
where site = 4
and rolead = 2
and i.user = u.user
and modulesunique > 13
and modulesunique <= 20
and hours <= 1
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• One user (mpongr01) was responsible for a misclassified instance where
his patient and module count were higher than normal but his hours
worked were much lower than normal. The pattern of activity (access
patient and then review demographics and test results) matches his
historical behavior so this was not considered inappropriate.

7.6 Run 46
This run was selected to see whether or not the location of the node in the tree
had any bearing on its usefulness. The different runs produce trees of various
depths. What does it mean that a group of instances are grouped based on a
single attribute? What does it mean when a group of instances require nine
decision points to be classified? The following two runs will compare nodes at
different path lengths (where a path length is the length of the path from the root
of the tree to a node) to see if the number of decision points would help improve
the usefulness of the tool for finding inappropriate behavior.
This run analyzes physicians and residents (physicians in training) from site 4.
The following SQL code was used for the date import.
SELECT modulesunique, patientstotal, APWW, printmodule,
if(rolead = 2, '1', if(rolead = 1, '1', '0')) as class
from instances, users
where instances.user = users.user
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and site = 4
This has a small number of attributes. The original list of 14 attributes26 was
filtered down to these three by means of WEKA's attribute filter function and
parameters. This filtering is the system’s guess at which attributes are most
relevant for classification purposes.
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 5) produced an overall accuracy of 87.1% and the true positive classification
of physicians and residents with an accuracy of 98.2%. The following tree was
produced.

7.6.1 Investigation 1
The first investigation deals with nodes with short paths. The node
[1(4191/352)] classified role 1, physicians and residents, with an accuracy of
91.7%. The classification was based on a single criterion: PatientsTotal > 7.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 4
and patientstotal > 7
and rolead not in (1, 2)
Of these 352 misclassified instances these observations were made.

26

14 is the number of columns in the Instances table.
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•

•

User bstrock had a very large increase in the number of logins in this
instance. His average number of logins was 12 but this instance he
logged in 70 times. The hours are higher than normal (7 versus 4) but
not enough to account for the large increase in logins. Upon further
investigation it was found that this user was part of the application
support team and was testing the system’s single sign-on functionality.
User avadineanu had a large increase in both the number of
PatientsUnique and PatientsTotal when compared to his historical
activity. Furthermore this user had a marked increase in the number of
print jobs. It was found that this user works for medical records and has
similar work days about every 2 weeks. This was considered normal
activity for this user.

7.6.2 Investigation 2
This investigation deals with nodes with medium length paths. The first node
[0(19/2)])] classifies role 0, not physicians or residents, with an accuracy of
89.5%. The classification is based on four decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7,
ModulesUnique > 10, ModulesUnique > 21, ModulesUnique > 24.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 4
and patientstotal <= 7
and modulesunique > 24
and rolead in (1, 2)
Of these 2 misclassified instances these observations were made.
• Both users had a large increase in the number of ModulesTotal when
compared to their historical behavior. However there was a
proportionally similar increase in the number of ModulesUnique.
Furthermore there was no increase in either the number of patients or the
number of hours. These two physicians were likely investigating new
capabilities or modules in the system.
The second investigation of medium length paths involves node [1(162/1)])].
This node classifies role 1 (i.e. physicians or residents) with an accuracy of
99.4%. The classification is based on five decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7,
ModulesUnique <= 10, PatientsTotal > 1, ModulesUnique <= 5,
ModulesUnique > 4.
SELECt * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 4
and patientstotal > 1
and modulesunique = 5
and rolead not in (1, 2)
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For the 1 misclassified instance these observation were made.
• This user’s (jjohnson) activity is in line with his historical behavior.
During investigation it was noticed that this user’s application RoleID
indicated his role was that of a physician. But the credentials used for
classifying (RoleAD) were blank. It is likely that this user was correctly
classified by WEKA but simply mislabeled in RoleAD.

7.6.3 Investigation 3
This investigation deals with nodes with longer length paths. The first node
[1(127/41)])] classifies role 1, physicians and residents, with an accuracy of
67.8%. The classification is based on eight decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7,
ModulesUnique <= 10, ModulesUnique > 5, PatientsTotal > 3, ModulesUnique
> 8, ModulesUnique > 9, PrintModule <=2.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 4
and rolead not in (1, 2)
and patientstotal in (4, 5, 6, 7)
and modulesunique = 10
and printmodule <= 2
Of these 41 misclassified instances these observations were made.
• None of these instances showed any substantial change from the user’s
historical patterns.
• Additionally there were no values which registered as suspicious.
The second investigation of longer length paths involves node [0(32/1)])]. This
node classifies role 0 (i.e. not physicians or residents) with an accuracy of
96.8%. The classification is based on seven decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7,
ModulesUnique <= 10, PatientsTotal <= 1, PatientsTotal <= 0, ModulesUnique
> 2, ModulesUnique > 5, ModulesUnique > 6.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 4
and rolead in (1, 2)
and patientstotal <= 0
and modulesunique = 6
For the 1 misclassified instance these observation were made.
• It was unexpected that the user was active in the system but accessed no
users. This was in line with his 4 other instances in the 60 day dataset so
no further investigation is warranted.
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7.7 Run 47
Run 47 is the second case where nodes at different depths of the decision tree
are compared. This run analyzes physicians from site 6. The following SQL
code was used to populate WEKA for this run.
SELECT modulesunique, patientsunique, APWW, PrintModule,
if(rolead = 1, '1', '0') as class
from instances, users
where instances.user = users.user
and site = 6
This has a small number of attributes. Filtering was done by manual inspection
and testing to find a group of attributes that produced a high level of accuracy
while creating a relatively small decision tree.
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 5) produced an overall accuracy of 74.9% and the true positive classification
of physicians with an accuracy of 95.0%. The following tree was produced.

7.7.1 Investigation 1
The first investigation deals with nodes with short paths. The node [1(22/3)]
classifies role 1, physicians, with an accuracy of 85.7%. The classification is
based on three criteria: APWW <= 0, PrintModule > 7 and ModulesUnique >
15.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 6
and rolead <> 1
and apww <= 0
and printmodule > 7
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and modulesunique > 15
Of these 3 misclassified instances these observations were made.
• Two users (ajoba01, adaggu01) had higher than normal counts for
PatientsUnique and PatientsTotal.
• These two users had higher than normal counts for ModulesTotal. Their
numbers for ModulesUnique were normal.
• The hours worked for these two were higher than normal, which
accounts for the above mentioned behavior.
• There third user (bboncz01) had no substantial change to his typical
behavior.
• These three users are all physician residents. It is not unexpected that
their behavior would be similar to that of physicians.
The second investigation was done to review with nodes with short paths. The
node [0(140/11)] classifies role 0, non-physicians, with an accuracy of 92.1%.
The classification is based on three criteria: APWW <= 0, PrintModule > 7 and
ModulesUnique <= 15.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 6
and rolead = 1
and apww <= 0
and printmodule > 7
and modulesunique <= 15
Of these 11 misclassified instances only a single point stood out.
• A user (mmoren01) had a large increase in his usual number of print
jobs. Upon review this physician had one day per month with a large
number of print jobs. This is likely due to his printing as a means of
billing.

7.7.2 Investigation 2
This investigation deals with nodes with medium length paths. The first node
[0(104/10)])] classifies role 0, non-physicians, with an accuracy of 90.3%. The
classification is based on six decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule < = 7,
ModulesUnique <=9, PatientsUnique <= 1, ModulesUnique <= 5,
ModulesUnique <= 4.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 6
and rolead = 1
and apww <= 0
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and printmodule <= 7
and modulesunique <= 4
and patientsunique <= 1
Of the 10 misclassified instances these observations were made.
• All 10 instances show physicians in a shorter than normal work day.
• Some of these instances show physicians working with the system but
not registering a single 100_ChangePatientContext event. This is rare
but not unexpected.
The second investigation deals with nodes with medium length paths. The first
node [1(323/43)])] classifies role 1, physicians, with an accuracy of 86.6%. The
classification is based on six decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule < = 7,
ModulesUnique <=9, PatientsUnique <= 1, ModulesUnique <= 5,
ModulesUnique > 4.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 6
and rolead <> 1
and apww <= 0
and printmodule <= 7
and modulesunique =5
and patientsunique <= 1
Of the 43 misclassified instances these observations were made.
• In general the decisions are limiting by nature. That is the decision path
tends towards small values (e.g. APWW >= 0, PatientsUnique <=1).
Nothing in the misclassified instances indicates any inappropriate
activity.
• On average the total hours for the individuals is almost 1.5 hours less
than each user’s average.
• 28 instances are either residents (physicians in training) or are actual
physicians that were mislabeled.

7.7.3 Investigation 3
This investigation deals with nodes with longer length paths. The node
[1(85/15)])] classifies role 1, physicians, with an accuracy of 82.3%. The
classification is based on eight decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule <= 7,
ModulesUnique > 9, ModulesUnique > 10, ModulesUnique > 13,
ModulesUnique <=22, PrintModule > 2 and PatientsUnique > 8.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 6
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and rolead <> 1
and apww <= 0
and printmodule in (3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
and modulesunique > 13
and modulesunique <= 22
and patientsunique > 8
Of these 15 misclassified instances these observations were made.
• All 15 of these instances were due to residents. It is not unusual that
these users act like physicians.
• The individual instances are in line with historical average for each user.
No inappropriate activity was found.
The second investigation deals with nodes with longer length paths. The first
node [0(75/29)])] classifies role 0, non-physicians, with an accuracy of 82.3%.
The classification is based on eight decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule <= 7,
ModulesUnique > 9, ModulesUnique > 10, ModulesUnique > 13,
ModulesUnique <=22, PrintModule > 2 and PatientsUnique <= 8.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 6
and rolead = 1
and apww <= 0
and printmodule in (3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
and modulesunique > 13
and modulesunique <= 22
and patientsunique <= 8
Of these 29 misclassified instances these observations were made.
• None of these instances are out of line with the user’s historical
behavior. These all appear to be non-malicious.

7.8 Run 48
The following two runs took a different approach. It was asked what filtering
can be done to make the model more accurate. Can instances that are statistical
outliers be ignored? How much more effective would a decision tree be if it
ignored those outliers?
In the following two examples, two decision trees were built. The first follows
earlier examples. Then another tree was built using only the correctly classified
instances in the first tree. Detailed investigations were then run on the resulting
decision tree.
This run analyzes case workers from site 2. For this site case workers staff
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account for 379 of the 9670 instances (3.9%). The following SQL code was
used for the date import.
SELECT logins, suspends, modulesunique, modulestotal, patientsunique,
patientstotal, APWW, PrintModule, WorkstationsUnique,
if(rolead = 13, '1', '0') as class
from instances, users
where instances.user = users.user
and site = 2
Attribute filtering was attempted, but was found to significantly reduce the
accuracy. The set of attributes used were found by trial and error to produce the
highest accuracy while creating the smallest tree.
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 5) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 96.8%. The
classification accuracy of actual medical records staff was 47.0%. The
following tree was generated.

To pull out instances that were misclassified, it was necessary to modify the
ARFF file that was produced by the initial tuning exercise. All instances that
were misclassified in this run were then removed (303). This included both
case workers misclassified as non-case workers as well as non-case workers
misclassified as case workers. The data set was then reclassified by WEKA.
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 5) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 99.6%. The
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classification accuracy of case workers was 88.7 %. The following tree was
generated.

7.8.1 Investigation 1
Following the previous example, two nodes were examined at the top, middle,
and bottom of the tree, respectively. The first investigation for a short path was
node [0(8561/1)]. This node contained a single case worker that was
misclassified.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 2
and rolead = 13
and ignoreinstance = 0
and apww <= 0
and patientsunique > 0
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• The user (tdavis09) had higher than usual counts for most attributes.
But the user also worked a day that was double a typical shift. The
numbers for this instance are reasonable considering the extended shift.

7.8.2 Investigation 2
This investigation examined paths of medium length. The first node [0(11/2)]
for consideration contained two case workers that were misclassified.
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SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 2
and rolead = 13
and ignoreinstance = 0
and apww <= 0
and patientsunique <= 0
and modulestotal > 40
and printmodule <= 3
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• The two users are in fact the same user (tdavis09) discussed above. In
these two cases the user had a much shorter shift than normal so the
counts appear appropriate.
• It should be noted that this user has a total of 24 instances in the data set.
Of these, 21 were removed as part of the initial tuning. The remaining 3
were discussed in the previous two investigations.
The second node for consideration [0(156/8)] contained 8 case workers that
were misclassified.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 2
and rolead = 13
and ignoreinstance = 0
and apww > 0
and patientsunique <= 20
and suspends <= 0
and logins <= 10
The following observations were made about this node.
• Most of these users had noticeable changes in their typical behavior, but
additionally had worked an atypical shift – either longer or shorter than
normal. There was no inappropriate activity found.
• It was found that these users were tagged as case workers in the
applications (i.e. RoleID) but were tagged as either nurses or medical
records staff in Windows (i.e. RoleAD).

The third node for consideration [0(32/3)] contained 3 case workers that were
misclassified.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 2
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and rolead = 13
and ignoreinstance = 0
and apww > 0
and patientsunique <= 20
and suspends > 0
and workstationsunique > 1
The following observations were made about this node.
• Similar to the previous nodes, there was no sign of inappropriate activity
in these instances.

7.8.3 Investigation 3
This investigation examined paths of longer length. The first node [1(157/17)]
for consideration contained 17 non-case workers that were misclassified.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 2
and rolead <> 13
and ignoreinstance = 0
and apww > 0
and patientsunique <= 17
and suspends > 0
and workstationsunique <= 1
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• Most of these users had noticeable changes in their typical behavior, but
additionally had worked an atypical shift – either longer or shorter than
normal. There was no inappropriate activity found.
• There were three users that accounted for 12 of the instances.
The final node for consideration [1(6/1] contained a single non-case worker that
was misclassified.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 2
and rolead <> 13
and ignoreinstance = 0
and apww > 0
and patientsunique in (18, 19, 20)
and suspends > 0
and workstationsunique <= 1
and modulesunique > 14
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The following observations were made about this node.
• The user (lstopka) had higher than average counts for most attributes.
• It is interesting to note that this user (lstopka) accounted for five of the
17 misclassified instances in the first run of investigation 3 (immediately
prior). .

7.9 Run 42
This run analyzed physician assistants from site 0. Note that this time, the role
attribute was pulled from the application (RoleID) instead of from Windows
(RoleAD). For this site physician assistants accounted for only 7882 of the
19295 instances. The following SQL code was used for the date import.
SELECT modulesunique, patientsunique, PrintModule, WorkstationsUnique,
if(roleid = 402, '1', '0') as class
from instances, users
where instances.user = users.user
and site = 0
Attribute filtering was applied and resulted in the select statement shown above.
Also this run did not use the typical J48 parameters. The original runs produced
very large trees with 191 leaves and a total size of 381. To shrink down the
tree, the J48 attribute governing the minimum number of objects per leaf was
changed from 5 to 50. This had a small negative impact on the overall accuracy
(82.3% to 77.3%). But the resulting tree was much more usable so this was
considered acceptable.
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 50) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 77.3%. The
classification accuracy of actual physician assistants was 70.5%. The following
tree was generated.
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All instances that were misclassified in this run were then removed (4,647).
This included both physician assistants that were misclassified as nonphysician assistants as well as non- physician assistants misclassified as
physician assistants. The data set was then reclassified by WEKA
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj
of 50) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 98.6%. The
classification accuracy of actual physician assistants was 98.2%. The following
tree was generated
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7.9.1 Investigation 1
Following the previous example, two nodes were examined at the top, middle,
and bottom of the tree, respectively. The first investigation for a short path was
node [1(162/11)]. This node contained 11 non-physician assistants that were
misclassified.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 0
and ignoreinstance = 0
and roleid <> 402
and printmodule <= 0
and modulesunique > 31
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• Of these 11 instances, 10 were IS staff.
• The one other misclassified instance was from a physician resident
(lnuth01). This user had a significantly more ModulesUnique (39)
compared to his average (15). During research, it was found that this
discrepancy was due to the user testing the mobile version of the
application that day.
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The second short-path node investigated was node [1(55/27)]. This node
misclassified 27 non-physician assistants.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 0
and ignoreinstance = 0
and roleid <> 402
and printmodule > 8
and workstationsunique > 2
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• The 14 users were responsible for the 27 instances. Two individual had
more than 4 misclassified instances in this node.
• One physician (cgo01) had 14 print modules even though her historical
average was 0. These were facesheet reports and over a 10 minute
period. This was likely done for billing purposes.

7.9.2 Investigation 2
This investigation examined a node with average length paths. The first
investigation was node [1(263/8)]. This node misclassified 8 non-physician
assistants.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 0
and ignoreinstance = 0
and roleid <> 402
and printmodule <= 0
and modulesunique = 4
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• One user (mhambl01) accounted for 4 of these instances. In two
instances most of his activity was less than normal including his hours.
This user’s activity over the full data set shows a wide range of values
for most attributes.
• It is interesting to note that a previously discussed user (cgo01) has
another instance in this node. During the overall tuning, 7 of her
instances were set to ignore – leaving 42 instances for this second pass.

7.9.3 Investigation 3
This investigation examined nodes with longer length paths. The first node
[1(148/3)] had 3 instances of non-physician assistants being misclassified.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
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where i.user = u.user
and site = 0
and ignoreinstance = 0
and roleid <> 402
and printmodule > 3
and modulesunique > 14
and workstationsunique <= 2
and patientsunique > 5
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• Two of the misclassified users were physicians.
• The other misclassified instance was due to a user (mthoma03) with a
job description of data assistant. This user’s activity is consistent with
his historical behavior, aside from the fact that he printed 4 times when
he averages 0. The 4 modules printed had no patient information so this
is not considered suspicious.
The second node of longer paths was [0(355/21)]. This node contained 21
misclassified physician assistants.
SELECT * from instances i, users u
where i.user = u.user
and site = 0
and ignoreinstance = 0
and roleid = 402
and printmodule in (1, 2, 3)
and modulesunique in (10, 11)
and workstationsunique <= 2
The following observations were made regarding this node.
• Activity for all 21 instances was at or below historical averages.
• When looking at RoleAD (which tends to be more accurate), 10 of the
misclassified users were physicians.

7.9.4 Outliers
This same run had been previously analyzed by means of a simple ad-hoc
review. There were two significantly atypical instances that were found by adhoc review. These are true outliers and were filtered by design.
• A user (bblack01) printed modules 50 times while in his other 51
instances he averaged 1 printer per day. Similarly his patients total was
91 for this instance but averaged less than 3 for the other days.
• User (lbialka) viewed 93 unique modules in a single instance in which
he worked only 1 hour. The other two instances for this user, he
averaged 11 unique modules. This ended up to be a bug in the system
where activity due to a single module was incorrectly logged. However
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with the data available this certainly constituted atypical behavior and
ideally would have been reviewed.
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8. Conclusion
This paper described the design and use of a system that could be used in
medical applications to help comply with the bevy of requirements that obligate
them to look for inappropriate activity.
By implementing machine learning methodologies, the system was successful at
detecting atypical behavior. It was able to accurately detect when a physician
was not acting like a physician. Conversely it successfully detected when a
pharmacist was acting like a physician.
Once the classification runs identified atypical instances, investigations were
called out to those instances which were suspicious. All three investigation
types produced instances that were suspicious. The ad-hoc method was the
most fruitful. This was likely due to the analyst’s intuitive review of the
decision tree. Conversely the filtered-classification was the least fruitful.
Of the roughly two dozen suspicious instances, none were in fact inappropriate
in our experiment. Here are some examples of flagged instances that were
suspicious but not inappropriate.
•
•
•
•
•

A physician printing out dozens of reports for billing purposes.
A user testing a new set of modules.
A user whose role was mislabeled in the application.
Users with very short or very long shifts
Many cases where a user's legitimate activity was truly erratic and
atypical when compared to his peers.

So the system successfully detected atypical behavior, and the investigations
highlighted those atypical instances that were suspicious, but none of these
turned out to be inappropriate. Determination of appropriateness requires
intense domain and context knowledge. What were the events of day that led a
nurse to look at a given record? This is a question that cannot be answered by
an automated system.
Overall the system did successful parse 65,000 instances over 2 months and
produced a list of 20 instances that were suspicious. This is a massive reduction
in work that would leave security analysts with a manageable amount of work
while still meeting a reasonable level of auditing.

8.1 Enhancements
During the course of this exercise, the system provided many unique views into
the users’ activity that had never been seen before. In addition to looking for
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inappropriate activity, this system may be used in various other ways, for
example:
1. It was noted that some doctors were using the system in way
significantly different than their peers. This was discussed with the
application support staff and this will be reviewed to see if information
can be used for training or efficiencies review of the doctors. There is
definite value to the organization to make physicians as efficient as
possible.
2. Can this model be applied to clinician performance review? For
example classification can be run comparing effective doctors and
ineffective doctors27. What can a comparison of their behaviors tell us?
Does the number of times a physician access radiology reports have any
bearing on the doctor’s overall effectiveness? If the system were
expanded to include other systems, it could consider the type of drugs
prescribed, consultations made and nurses who interacted with the
patient. How do these values relate to the effectiveness of the
physician?
3. Can this model be applied to site performance review? Similar to the
clinician discussion above, what would a comparison of hospitals within
a system show? This could consider all sorts of inputs such as hours of
mandated training, nurse satisfaction and dollars spent on health IT.
4. Is it possible to tune the dataset over time? For example if certain users
are known to act significantly different from their peers (but still in an
appropriate fashion), this user should be removed from consideration.
Over the course of several iterations, pulling these safe but atypical users
from the dataset may make a more accurate mapping.
5. This system was able to detect when someone’s activity changed
overtime. What does it mean if the user’s average print jobs changes
significantly? It would be nice to analyze decision trees to see how a
suspect user compares to his peers.
6. Would combined filtering produce better results? It was shown that
filtered-classification produced some meaningful results but missed
some suspicious outliers. Running ad-hoc analysis followed by filteredclassification would likely produce better results.

27

There are numerous outcome measurements that could be used for this.

Page 47

9. Appendix
9.1 Supporting Documents
Document Name
PreProcess.pl
PreProcessOut.csv
WekaDBManagement.pl
RoleID Codes.XLS
43.ARFF
38.ARFF
46.ARFF
47.ARFF
42.ARFF
42-Tuned.ARFF
48.ARFF
48-Tuned.ARFF

Description
PreProcess PERL script
Output of PreProcess activities
WekaDBManagement PERL script
Listing of application IDs
Output of WEKA for run 43
Output of WEKA for run 38
Output of WEKA for run 46
Output of WEKA for run 47
Output of WEKA for run 42
Output of WEKA for run 42 (after tuning)
Output of WEKA for run 48
Output of WEKA for run 48 (after tuning)
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9.2 Independent Study Application
Summary
Using various information classification methods, architect and prototype
system that will automatically classify health care workers and then flag a
worker when his activity is atypical to others in a similar role.

Problem Statement
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires
health care entities to look for and deal with security incidents. Unfortunately
due to the complex nature of health care it is often difficult as well as
impractical to enforce strict access controls to patient data. Restricting a
physician’s access to medical data could directly impact critical, time sensitive
treatment. But this limited control can be abused by health care workers to
‘snoop’ or otherwise access private medical information inappropriately.
This system will be able to detect when a member of a group (such as
physicians, nurses, radiologists) acts different then his peers. The intent is to
provide health care providers a means of flagging atypical activity to satisfy the
HIPAA requirements.

Deliverable
The deliverables will include:
• System as described above with documentation
• Documentation of practical management of such a system including
tuning of alerts, time span for optimal analysis, and the management of
‘false positives’ (i.e. incorrectly labeling activity as a negative event).
• Report on effectiveness of the system based on multiple factors such as
worker’s attributes (role, training, etc), organizational attributes
(comparing different facilities, maturity of role definition within
organization, etc) and various classification models

Evaluation
Evaluation of final product will be based on the following:
• Capability to detect atypical activity within the system
• Ability to tune system regarding false positives. Specifically ability to
filter out events that are incorrectly flagged as atypical.
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•

•

Comprehensive activity report allowing investigator to determine if
atypical behavior is inappropriate. That is, does this constitute a HIPAA
violation?
Proposed model can be used with other medical applications
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